Abstract: Authentication with key-agreement protocols for multi-server architecture are emerging as a solution to conquer the traditional client-server architecture's limitations such as repeated registrations with distinct tokens and credentials. Since Li et al.'s first proposed authentication protocol for multi-server architecture, several liken protocols have tailed this queue. Majority of these protocols have been designed while the users sharing their plain or digested credentials with the servers during either registration or authentication phases. This weakens the security by making it vulnerable to severe security threats called privileged insider attacks, user impersonation attacks and server impersonation attacks. To overcome the aforementioned problems, this paper put forwards an authentication with key-agreement protocol for multi-server architecture based on biometrics. The proposed protocol is absolutely light-weight due to its design mainly based on one-way hash function. The analysis section of this paper shows that the proposed protocol performs better than related protocols and makes it suitable for practical applications.
Introduction
The vast expansion of internet and ubiquitous computing technologies have necessitated the authentication of every remote user. Cryptographic authentication is a secure practice of transferring credentials to determine someone, in fact, who they are proclaimed to be and providing authorization to access the services subsequently. Typical authentication can be obtained in distinctive ways namely knowledge factors (passwords), possession factors (tokens) and inherence factors (biometrics) are some well-known methods. Several authors designed authentication protocols for multi-server environment using either two of the above factors or all the three factors [1] - [22] . This paper discusses the recently proposed three-factor authentication protocols under the hypothesis of biometrics are more robust than passwords and smartcards.
Related works: In 2010, Yang et al. [1] introduced a biometric password-based multi-server authentication protocol with smartcards. Their protocol requires lots of computations and is prone to insider attacks. In 2011, Yoon et al. [2] put forward a three-factor authentication protocol for multi-server architecture based on elliptic curve cryptography. Later on, He in 2011 [3] & Kim et al. [4] in 2012 proved that Yoon et al. ' s protocol cannot resist masquerade attacks, insider attacks, stolen smartcard attacks and off-line password guessing attacks. Kim et al. [4] further proposed a biometric based authentication protocol for multi-server protocol, which was found to be lacking user anonymity and correctness in the login and password changing the proposed scheme in detail. Section 4 affords performance analysis. At last, Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Proposed Protocol
This section proposes three-factor remote mutual authentication with key agreement protocol for multi-server architecture. The proposed protocol comprises three participants: user (Ui), application server (AS), registration server (RS) and seven phases: application server registration phase, user registration phase, login phase, mutual authentication with key agreement phase, password and biometrics changing phase, dynamic server addition phase, and user revocation/re-registration phase. The various notations used in the proposed protocol are listed in Table 1 .
Application Server Registration Phase

User Registration Phase
Fig. 1. Summary of user registration phase.
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In this phase, a new AS sends a registration request to the RS in order to become an authorized server of the network. The AS registration process occurs via a secure channel with following steps:
Step 1: AS sends registration request < SIDA > to the RS.
Step 2:
RS computes KS = h(SIDA || ASK) and RS stores {SIDA, KS} in its database table TS.
Step 3:
RS sends < KS, h(ASK) > to AS, which can be used in further phases of authentication.
A new Ui, who desires to avail the services provided by any AS must register with RS. Assume that Ui obtains a SC with the value {h(· )} upon formal request to RS. Ui goes after the following steps to register with RS via a secure channel as shown in Fig. 1 .
Step 1: Ui chooses IDU, PWU, and generates a random number ru ∈ Zp*. Ui computes PIDU = h(IDU || ru), PWDU = h(PWU || ru) and sends a request message < PIDU, PWDU > to RS.
Step 2: RS verifies the duplication of PIDU and then computes QS = h(PIDU || KS), RS = QS ⊕ PWDU for all the registered SIDA and stores {SIDA, RS} in the Step 1:
, WS = XS ⊕ PWDU and then verifies whether the condition CU ≟ h(IDU || WS) holds. If it generates a negative result, the login request can be terminated. Otherwise, the list of AS appears on the card reading machine.
Step 2:
SC AS: M1 = < BUS, DUS, N1 > Ui selects the AS he wanted to communicate, then SC retrieves corresponding AS's RS value from TU and extracts QS = RS ⊕ PWDU. SC generates N1 ∈ Zp* and computes
. SC launches the login request message M1 = < BUS, DUS, N1 > to AS.
Mutual Authentication with Key-Agreement Phase
During this phase, Ui and AS authenticates each other and computes a session key for further secure communication over public channel. The entire mutual authentication with key agreement phase is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
Summary of login and mutual authentication phases.
Step 1:
(ASK)), QS = h(PIDU || KS) and verifies the condition DUS ≟ h(PIDU || QS || N1)
. If the condition holds, then AS can authenticate Ui otherwise the process can be terminated.
Step 2: AS SC: M2 = < ESU, N2 > AS generates N2 ∈ Zp* and computes SK = h(QS || N1 || N2 || PIDU), ESU = h(SK || SIDA || N1 || N2), and then sends M2 = < ESU, N2 > to SC.
Step 3: SC AS: M3 = < FUS > SC computes SK = h(QS || N1 || N2 || PIDU) and verifies the condition ESU ≟ h(SK || SIDA || N1 || N2). If the condition holds, then Ui can authenticate AS, otherwise the process can be terminated. SC computes FUS = h(SIDA || N1 || N2 || SK) and sends it to AS.
Step 4: AS verifies FUS ≟ h(SIDA || N1 || N2 || SK) and reconfirms the authenticity of Ui. Now, Ui and AS are set to start the communication with the computed session key SK.
Password and Biometrics Changing Phase
This procedure is invoked when Ui wish to update his/her existing password or biometrics with new ones. In this procedure, Ui can change his password or biometrics by inserting SC and inputting IDU, PWU and BIOU′ over a secure channel without the help of RS as follows.
, WS = XS ⊕ PWDU and then verifies whether the condition CU ≟ h(IDU || WS) holds. If it generates a negative result, the login request can be terminated.
Step 2: SC retrieves RS = QS ⊕ PWDU for all SIDA using the current PWU. Ui chooses a new password PWU # and scans new BIOU # and then computes
Step 3: Ui updates the table TU # and the parameters XS # , VU # , θU # on the SC. Thus, the SC finally consists of the
Dynamic Addition of Application Server Phase
In this phase, a new application server AS new can join the existing network by sending a registration request to the RS in order to become an authorized server. The new application server's information will be forwarded to the existing users of the network periodically using their stored {PIDU, CU} or upon the request for updates from Ui. In any of the above two cases, Ui is expected to pass through login phase successfully. The AS new registration process consists of following steps.
Step 1: AS new sends registration request < SIDA new > to the RS.
Step 2: RS computes KS new = h(SIDA new || ASK), and RS stores {SIDA new , KS new } in TS.
Step 3: RS sends < KS new > to AS new via a secure channel, which can be used in further phases of authentication.
Step 
User Revocation/Re-Registration Phase
This phase directs Ui when he/she wants revoke the available services or re-register with different identity. In any of the above two cases, Ui is expected to pass through login phase successfully. Both the phases occurs via a secure channel as explained below.
Revocation: During the revocation phase, Ui proves his/her legitimacy and submits the acquired SC to the RS. Upon receiving the request, RS sets TR = 0 and updates {PIDU, CU, TR = 0} in the table TC, where TR = 0 means Ui is revoked and inactive. When Ui wishes to resume his/her previous services, then Ui must prove his/her PIDU ≟ h(IDU || rU), PWDU ≟ h(PWU || rU) by retrieving QS = RS ⊕ PWDU using the last recent IDU, PWU, and BIO. If Ui holds the correct credentials, then RS resumes Ui's services and updates {PIDU, CU, TR = 1} in the table TC.
Re-registration: When Ui wants to re-register with the new credentials, then he/she must prove his/her legitimacy and send the request to RS. Upon receiving the request, RS follows the steps described in user registration phase and updates {PIDU, CU, TR = TR + 1} in the table TC.
Security Analysis
This section demonstrates the security analysis of the proposed protocol by describing each security feature. The main aim of the proposed protocol is to increase the degree of security of communicating messages over public or insecure channels. Proof. The transmitted messages < M1, M2, M3 > between Ui and AS during the login and authentication phases are arbitrary for each session due to their association with the random numbers N1 and N2. Ui's original identity IDU is encapsulated in the form of BUS = PIDU ⊕ h(SIDA || N1 || h(ASK)), where PIDU = h(IDU || rU). The similar approach is followed in case of all the parameters < BUS, DUS, N1 >, < ESU, N2 >, and < FUS > and accomplished user anonymity. The proposed protocol also provides another important feature called untraceability. The randomness of all the parameters makes it unidentifiable and untraceable to the adversaries.
Proposition 2. The proposed protocol is secure against replay attacks.
Proof a. Ӕ may try to establish a new session while impersonating a valid user by replaying the previous transmitted message < M1 >. However, the proposed protocol can withstand replay attacks using random number N1 as explained here. During the login and mutual authentication phase, AS receives the message < BUS, DUS, N1 > and stores the pair {PIDU, N1} in its database. If Ӕ replays the same message < M1 Ӕ >, AS retrieves {PIDU, N1 Ӕ } and compares with the stored {PIDU, N1}. When AS finds N1 Ӕ == N1, then it drops the request and terminate the process. Ui and AS follows the similar way to defy the replay attack on response messages < ESU, N2 > and < FUS >.
Proposition 3.
The proposed protocol is secure against stolen smartcard attacks.
Proof. With the hypothesis that Ӕ can read a SC stored values using various methods as discussed in, this section describes the resistance of the proposed protocol to stolen smartcard attack. Assume that Ӕ is able to read the stored parameters {XS, VU, CU, TU, θU, h(· ), h(ASK)} on a stolen legitimate SC. Now, Ӕ may try either launching an authentication request to gain the access to AS or try deriving actual Ui's credentials from the extracted parameters. However, Ӕ undeniably cannot perform any of above actions using these values, since all the important parameters such as RS = QS ⊕ PWDU, XS = WS ⊕ PWDU, VU = rU ⊕ h(σU) are safeguarded with h(.), where PIDU = h(IDU || rU) and PWDU = h(PWU || rU). Ӕ can neither obtain the credentials nor build an authentication request < M1 > using the stolen SC due to the unavailability of IDU, PWU and BIOU. At the same time guessing the IDU, PWU and forging BIOU are impractical. Therefore, the proposed protocol can withstand smartcard stolen attacks. Proof a. Assume a situation where Ӕ possesses a valid SC and wants to gain network access by perpetrating user impersonation attack. If Ӕ wants to impersonate a legitimate Ui, he/she requires to build a login request message M1 = < BUS, DUS, N1 >. On the other hand, Ӕ should undergo login phase before making authentication request. During login phase, SC computes σU′ = Rep(BIOU′, θU), rU = VU ⊕ h(σU′), PIDU = h(IDU || rU), PWDU = h(PWU || rU), WS = XS ⊕ PWDU and then verifies whether the condition CU ≟ h(IDU || WS) holds. Unless the Ӕ passes the correct credentials, he/she cannot enter into the further phases. Therefore, Ӕ certainly requires legitimate credentials for any likewise computations. However, the probability of yielding correct IDU and PWU is negligible. Though the Ӕ performs guessing attacks for IDU and PWU, he/she definitely cannot forge or copy valid Ui's BIOU.
Proof b. The proposed protocol does not share much personal identifiable information of Ui to any AS. During login and mutual authentication phase, AS can obtain only PIDU of legitimate Ui via PIDU = BUS ⊕ h(SIDA || N1 || h(ASK)). For instance, if any AS turns as Ӕ and wants to impersonate a valid Ui, he/she still requires KS of targeted AS to construct QS = h(PIDU || KS). In the proposed protocol, QS value is unique for each AS, where KS = h(SIDA || ASK). Aforementioned constraints prove that our scheme is secure from user impersonation attacks.
Proposition 5. The proposed protocol is secure against application server impersonation attacks. Volume 13, Number 2, February 2018
Proof. Consider a scenario where a registered AS turned as Ӕ captures < M1 > and tries to impersonate valid AS by responding with computed message < M2 Ӕ >. From the captured M1, Ӕ can barely obtain PIDU = BUS ⊕ h(SIDA || N1 || h(ASK)) and N1 when it is assumed of having SIDA. In order to compute the response M2 Ӕ , QS value of the targeted AS and Ui is a prerequisite since each AS of the proposed protocol holds unique long-term key KS which is computed based on SIDA as KS = h(SIDA || ASK). Thus, Ӕ cannot compute SK = h(QS || N1 || N2 || PIDU), ESU = h(SK || SIDA || N1 || N2) and reply Ui. Let's take another case where
, and then sends M2 Ӕ = < ESU Ӕ , N2 > to SC. Upon receiving the response, Ui computes SK = h(QS || N1 || N2 || PIDU), ESU = h(SK || SIDA || N1 || N2) and can identify it as a malicious attempt due to the non-equivalence of messages ESU Ӕ ≠ ESU. It is evident from the above statements that the proposed protocol can withstand application server impersonation attacks.
Proposition 6. The proposed protocol is secure against password guessing attacks.
Proof. Ӕ may try to guess the PWU using the extracted parameters stored on SC{XS, VU, CU, TU, θU, h(· ), h(ASK)} or keep trying to login while guessing the PWU. However, Ӕ cannot validate the guessed PWU due to non-availability of parameter rU.
On the other hand, rU value is protected with Ui's BIOU in the form of (σU, θU) = Gen(BIOU), and VU = rU ⊕ h(σU) and it is believed to be impractical to forge a valid Ui's BIOU. The Ӕ definitely cannot proceed further without passing correct BIOU resulting in failure of validating the guessed password using PIDU = h(IDU || rU), PWDU = h(PWU || rU), WS = XS ⊕ PWDU, CU ≟ h(IDU || WS). In this way, the proposed protocol is secure against password guessing attacks. He [11] 2015
Wang [9] 2016
Proposed Protocol
User anonymity and untraceability
Provides user revocation/re-registration phase
The proposed protocol is secure against privileged insider attacks.
Proof. During user registration phase of the proposed protocol scenario, Ui does not submit either the plain credentials or the digest of credentials alone to the RS. Ui submits PIDU = h(IDU || rU), and PWDU = h(PWU || rU) to RS, where rU ∈ Zp * is a random number. Thus, an insider cannot obtain the original credentials of any Ui. Additionally, the proposed protocol is designed on the basis of not maintaining password verification tables and the authentication of entities is being done by verifying the accuracy of received messages such as DUS ≟ h(PIDU || QS || N1). Therefore, the proposed protocol attains resistance to insider attacks. Volume 13, Number 2, February 2018 
Performance Analysis
This section demonstrates the comparison between the proposed protocol and other related protocols in terms of various aspects such as security, and computational cost. The performance analysis ensures that the proposed protocol is efficient and better in every aspect when compared to other authentication protocols for multi-server architecture.
Functionality comparison: Here, the proposed protocol is compared with the three-factor authentication protocols such as Chuang et al., Mishra et Table 2 . It is evident from the Table that except the proposed protocol, all the other three-factor protocols are vulnerable to various security attacks whereas the proposed protocol can prevent user and server impersonation attacks, and also provides perfect user anonymity, user revocation and re-registration phase.
Computational cost comparison: To evaluate the computational cost analysis, we give few notations for the involved actions in all the compared protocols such as Th: Time complexity of a one-way hash function; Tp: Time complexity of a point multiplication operation on elliptic curve; Tf: Time complexity of encryption or decryption function. To evaluate the computational time analysis, we account Th  0.0023ms, Tp  2.226ms, Tf  0.0046ms as reported in [12] .
From the , and the proposed protocol's login and authentication phase requires the computation complexity of 16Th, 17Th, 16Th, 23Th + 8Tp, 14Th, and 15Th, respectively. As shown in Table 4 
Conclusion
This paper has conducted an extensive study of the existing authentication protocols for multi-server environment that are developed based three-factor methodologies. We have reviewed few of the recently proposed protocols and spotted severe security drawbacks due to the flaws in their designs. Thus, we have proposed another protocol on the key point of achieving mutual authentication with key-agreement without sharing decisive personal identifiable information. The proposed protocol is also a three-factor and light-weight protocol. The comparison and analysis sections of this paper proves that the proposed protocol performs better than other related protocol.
